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Una amplia literatura ha generado importantes ideas respecto de las causas financieras y
macroeconómicas de las crisis bancarias. Muchas de estas causas - desde los lapsos en la regulación
financiera hasta determinados esfuerzos por mantener un tipo de cambio fijo - tienen en común sus
orígenes como decisiones de política de actores políticos. Numerosos criterios no técnicos, desde la
identidad e intereses de distritos electorales políticos hasta las instituciones políticas y electorales,
condicionan los incentivos de quienes toman las decisiones políticas para hacer o corregir "errores"
políticos. Este trabajo explora el rol de una importante institución política, la presencia o ausencia
de pesos y contrapesos de poder político. Los pesos y contrapesos influencian la independencia de
los reguladores, el valor y el costo de pagos de intereses especiales hacia los hacedores de política, y
los incentivos políticos individuales para evitar fallas de política colectivas. La evidencia sugiere
que las causas financieras y económicas de las crisis, consistentes con estos argumentos, difieren
significativamente en países que exhiben pocos o muchos pesos y contrapesos de poder político.
Abstract
A large body of research has provided significant insights into the financial and macroeconomic
causes of banking crises.  Many of these causes - ranging from lapses in financial regulation to
determined efforts to maintain a fixed exchange rate - have in common their origins as policy
decisions of political actors.  Numerous non-technical criteria, ranging from the identity and
interests of political constituencies to political and electoral institutions, condition the incentives of
political decision makers to make or correct policy "mistakes".  This paper explores the role of one
significant political institution, the presence or absence of political checks and balances. Checks and
balances influence the independence of regulators, the value and cost of special interest payoffs to
policy makers, and individual political incentives to avoid collective policy failures. The evidence
suggests that the financial and economic causes of crisis, consistent with these arguments, differ
significantly in countries that exhibit few or many political checks and balances.
____________________
This paper is a chapter of the forthcoming book Banking, Financial Integration, and International Crises,
edited by Leonardo Hernández and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Banco Central de Chile, Santiago, 2002.
E-mail: pkeefer@worldbank.org.1 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
1
There is likely to be little disagreement with the observation that
political interference has exacerbated the problems associated with
bank insolvencies. Nevertheless, most of the analytical attention given
to bank crises has focused on technocratic mistakes (inappropriate
regulatory choices), exogenous shocks, contagion effects, and other
purely economic determinants of crisis. The implicit political economy
assumption underpinning this work is that politicians in different coun-
tries generally respond similarly to political opportunities in the fi-
nancial sector, and to crises in the financial sector, so that one need
not control for political parameters when examining financial sector
crises. This assumption is helpful in isolating the relationships among
economic variables. However, as a factual matter, the incentives of
political actors differ significantly across countries. One way in which
they differ, and which is the focus of this paper, is in the extent of
checks and balances that they exhibit in government decisionmaking.1
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1. Numerous other institutional differences among countries could matter
for the speed with which they respond to bank insolvencies, the ease with which
they adjust to exogenous events that could precipitate crisis, and the credibility
with which their actions are viewed by markets. These include whether the elec-
toral systems of countries exert severe or moderate fundraising pressures on
candidates and parties; the extent to which political decisionmakers respond to
narrow or broad constituencies; the horizons of political leaders; the extent to
which political leaders or society as a whole are ideologically polarized; and the
distribution of different economic constituencies among key decisionmakers.Philip Keefer 2
Differences such as these have implications both for the speed with
which political actors respond to incipient crisis situations, and for
the sorts of regulatory and economic policies that they follow that
influence whether crises develop in the first place.
Politicians and government officials in all countries have found it
convenient, for a number of reasons, to protect imprudent banks, but
the extent to which they do this varies significantly across countries.
In Venezuela the governor of the central bank was allowed to main-
tain his ownership of Banco Latino, whose rapid growth eventually
precipitated that country’s massive crisis. In the United States, mem-
bers of Congress exercised influence on regulators to protect their
savings and loan constituents, but with much more modest effects.
The Albanian pyramid schemes, certainly a phenomenon that flow-
ered with significant government support, generated a financial col-
lapse that, relative to that country’s GDP, dwarfed the consequences
of even the worst-case predictions for the Japanese banking sector.
These examples suggest that institutional and social differences be-
tween countries certainly do affect how politicians handle the finan-
cial sector. Nevertheless, this less-than-adventurous claim has not
been examined in any detail.2
The extent of checks and balances affects the probability of bank
crisis in two ways. First, checks and balances may directly influence
the magnitude and probability of financial crises, for example through
their effect on intragovernmental negotiating costs that slow the
response to an incipient crisis. Second, checks and balances may
indirectly influence the probability of banking crises by changing the
effects of other determinants of crisis, such as interest rate
liberalization. Evidence reported in the empirical section of this paper
suggests a strong indirect effect of checks and balances on banking
crises: policy variables such as fiscal deficits, deposit insurance, and
interest rate controls have a substantially different effect on crisis
outcomes in countries where checks and balances are extensive than
in countries where they are not.
2. This is not to say that the politics of financial sector reforms in different
countries has not been the focus of attention. Considerable work has identified
the political causes of crisis in the United States (for example, Romer and Weingast,
1991), but there has been little or no analysis of whether the political causes of
crisis differ systematically across countries.3 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
1. CHECKS AND BALANCES AS AN AGGRAVATING
FACTOR IN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Checks and balances prevail in a country when multiple players
with different interests, each of whom holds veto power, must ap-
prove policies as a condition of their implementation. A variety of
institutional arrangements give rise to multiple veto players. One
common example is that of coalition governments, which are com-
posed of different parties each of which can, by withdrawing its
support, cause a government to fall. A second is systems where
executive and legislative power are divided, or where the legislature
has two chambers, so that the cooperation of multiple bodies is re-
quired for legislation to be approved.3
This section summarizes several bodies of research that predict a
negative influence of checks and balances on economic outcomes.
The following section considers arguments that conclude that the
presence of checks and balances may mitigate financial sector crises.
The third section evaluates the indirect effects.
One literature argues that multiple veto players confront a col-
lective action problem in devising a response to shocks, since none of
them bears all of the costs of large deficits, but all bear the full costs
of budget cuts incurred by their constituencies. McCubbins (1991) and
others argue that spending will fall less in response to shocks when a
party in favor of more spending controls one of the veto gates (the
decisionmaking bodies charged with approving spending decisions).
Since an increase in the number of veto gates (checks and balances)
raises the probability that such a party will control at least one of the
veto gates, checks and balances should delay the response to crisis.
Alesina and Drazen (1991) also begin with the collective action
problem confronting multiple actors.4 They argue that information
asymmetries among the actors delay their response to shocks.
Decisionmakers have asymmetric information about the costs of ad-
justment of their opposition; waiting to respond to a crisis therefore
has value, because it reveals additional information about the opposi-
tion. Outside of their model, however, it is plausibly the case that
3. Differences in interests can emerge from numerous sources: the constitu-
encies that they represent, their time horizons, their personal financial activities,
and so forth.
4. Although they do not explicitly discuss divided government, they do assume
that agreement on policy change must be approved by two groups with different
interests.Philip Keefer 4
problems of asymmetric information worsen with the number of
decisionmakers, exacerbating the delay. Spolaore (1993) shows ex-
plicitly that inefficiency in the reaction to budget shocks increases
with the number of veto players.5
The conclusions of this literature, if not its specific assumptions,
have found empirical support. Roubini and Sachs (1989) find that most
member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) held to relatively sound fiscal policies until
the oil crisis of the early 1970s. With the onset of that crisis, those
governments that were divided failed to make rapid fiscal adjustments
and experienced higher inflation. Roubini and Sach do not address
the overall efficiency of fiscal policy except to observe that, before
the crisis, most countries, with or without divided government,
tended to have fairly balanced fiscal policies, albeit with significantly
different levels of government spending as a fraction of GDP.
The extension of the conclusions of this literature to the analysis
of government responses to bank insolvencies is straightforward. All
of the different conditions that in the literature are argued to gener-
ate delay in responding to fiscal crisis are generally present as well in
financial sector crises. First, a delayed response to financial sector
insolvencies, like that to fiscal shocks, is detrimental. Unresolved
insolvencies create opportunities for insolvent or near-insolvent banks
to “gamble for resurrection,” as Akerlof and Romer describe it.  Sec-
ond, as with fiscal policy, a response to financial crisis generally re-
quires the agreement of all primary government decisionmakers; more
checks and balances increase the likelihood that the interests of im-
prudent banks will be protected by at least one of the checks, delay-
ing intervention in insolvent institutions. Third, decisions must also
be made in the face of considerable uncertainty not only about which
institutions are insolvent, but also about the costs and benefits for
the constituencies of decisionmakers and their political opponents.
Since the initial conditions in the analysis of banking crises match
those assumed in the literature on fiscal adjustment and checks and
balances, the predictions of this literature ought to apply as well to
banking crises. Governments that operate with more numerous checks
and balances are likely to delay in responding to early warning signs
of bank crisis, intervening late in insolvent institutions and leaving
inappropriate regulatory frameworks intact for too long. For ex-
ample, prudent financial regulation often demands that regulators
5. A social planner, implicitly representing the median voter in a country, res-
ponds ideally to the shock.5 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
shut insolvent financial institutions down. This typically requires
financial resources, for which regulators may have to appeal to the
political authorities. Approval for such resources is likely to be de-
layed when checks and balances are extensive and more political
actors must agree on them. This effect of checks and balances should
raise the probability of a severe or systemic bank crisis.
To summarize, the existing literature implies that more nu-
merous checks and balances should increase the probability of bank
crisis.
2. CHECKS AND BALANCES AS A MITIGATING FACTOR
IN FINANCIAL CRISIS
Although checks and balances may introduce bargaining costs
that exacerbate the costs of a crisis, they may also have the opposite
effect of making it more difficult for governments to shift the costs of
financial sector crises onto unrepresented sectors in society. By this
logic, checks and balances can give rise to pressures, which would
not otherwise exist, to correct regulatory shortcomings or to inter-
vene in insolvent institutions.
There is ample evidence that the absence of checks and balances,
particularly outside of the OECD, is associated with lack of political
representation for large segments of society. There is good reason to
expect such an association, since institutional checks are a (usually
explicit) constitutional device to ensure that no single interest can
control the reins of government. Multiple groups attempt to ensure
that, in postconstitutional lawmaking, their interests will not be preju-
diced. They do this by granting themselves or their representatives
veto power over legislation. If a single interest group controlled the
constitutional process and desired to govern exclusively, it would find
it counterproductive to introduce checks and balances.
The importance of this for economic policymaking is straightfor-
ward. Since political decisionmakers in any system first seek to have
their projects paid for by groups with no representation in the
policymaking process, the larger are any unrepresented constituen-
cies, the easier it is to adopt highly inefficient policies. Excess ineffi-
ciencies can be shifted to the unrepresented groups, raising the net
benefits of these policies to those constituencies that do exercise
influence over veto players in the government.
This suggests that the existence of checks and balances, be-
cause of their association with more complete representation ofPhilip Keefer 6
interests in a society, can also moderate inefficiencies such as those
that give rise to bank crises.6 Decisionmakers who cannot shift a
sufficiently large share of the costs of their policies onto unrepre-
sented interests are less likely to approve inefficient fiscal or regu-
latory decisions than decisionmakers that can.
The notion that checks and balances are benign, or even ben-
eficial, is not foreign to the political economy literature. Spolaore
(1993) uses logic similar to that presented above to conclude that
a single veto player—a single-party government—will protect its
constituency and overreact to crisis, imposing excessive costs on
the economy. His model, nevertheless, yields the result that mul-
tiple decision makers are less efficient. Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995) suggest that divided government is a mechanism used by
voters to ensure that parties, even though polarized by the activ-
ists that control them, pursue moderate goals. They take for
granted the existence of multiple veto points and suggest that
voters rationally distribute control of government to multiple par-
ties with different preferences. To the extent that moderate goals
are consistent with prudent regulation of the financial sector, their
arguments are also consistent with the conclusions of this section.
To summarize, then, there are reasons to expect checks and
balan-ces to have both positive and negative effects on the prob-
ability of bank crises. This paper examines whether, as an empiri-
cal matter, the net effect of these offsetting influences is zero, or
whether one or the other set of effects predominates.
3. THE INTERACTION AMONG THE POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND FINANCIAL CAUSES OF BANK CRISES
Policymakers and researchers have typically focused on economic
and financial sector variables and policy instruments in the analysis
of financial sector crises. The effect of most of these, however, can be
influenced by government decisions, in at least two ways. First, fi-
nancial sector regulators can potentially mitigate the impact of these
6. McGuire and Olson (1996) argue that stable dictators with an encompass-
ing interest in their domain (for example, complete ability to tax all economic
activity) will approve, as they describe it, surprisingly efficient taxation policies.
The assumption in this paper is that the extent to which governments collectively
have an encompassing interest over the whole country is related to the number of
decisionmakers. The evidence presented regarding the financial sector is, in any
case, consistent with this assumption.7 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
variables on the probability of banking crises. The presence of checks
and balances, in turn, affects the discretion with which financial sec-
tor regulators can act. For this reason, one would expect the specific
impact of different financial and economic sector variables on a crisis
to vary depending on the level of checks and balances.
Second, the belief of private sector actors that government poli-
cies will be sustained into the future also influences whether these
policies have a large or a small effect on the probability of banking
crises. Checks and balances have a significant impact on the ability of
governments to reverse policies or to renege on policy announce-
ments. Again, checks and balances should significantly influence the
effects of those variables for which the credibility of government
matters.
Private credit provides an example of the regulatory effect of
checks and balances. An increase in private credit as a fraction of
GDP is more likely to result in an increased volume of high-risk loans
in the absence of sound prudential regulation. Similarly, the liberali-
zation of interest rates permits bankers to attract funds by raising
deposit rates of interest and to use these funds to make high-inter-
est, high-risk loans that they otherwise would not extend, increa-
sing the probability of bank crisis. Their ability to do this is restricted
when regulators are free to limit the risk of bank portfolios and to
shut down insolvent institutions. The impact of both of these vari-
ables on the probability of bank crisis should therefore be different in
countries that exhibit extensive checks and balances than in coun-
tries that do not.7
Exchange rate changes offer an example of the credibility effects
of checks and balances. Bankers are unlikely to take on substantial
liabilities denominated in foreign currency if their government can-
not make credible promises regarding the exchange rate. Conse-
quently, exchange rate movements should have less of an impact on
banking crises when governments exhibit few checks and balances.
The remainder of this section presents in greater detail the dif-
ferent economic and financial sector variables that are thought to
influence crises, and the likely effects that regulatory independence
7. Two assumptions underlie this conclusion. The first is that the regulators
do not need to appeal to political authorities for additional funding to carry out
their regulatory function. The second is that regulators are more interested than
political actors in maintaining the solvency of the financial system. In many coun-
tries, of course, regulators have been found to have a financial interest in the
institutions they regulate. This naturally dulls their incentive to act vigorously in
defense of the solvency of the system.Philip Keefer 8
(and therefore checks and balances) are likely to have on them.
The various economic and financial determinants of systemic bank
crises are comprehensively reviewed in Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1997). Economic variables thought to be important
for the financial sector include those that describe the general health
of the economy. Among these are real GDP growth, inflation, and
income per capita; shocks, such as movements in the terms of trade;
and macroeconomic variables that are more directly susceptible to
policy intervention. These include exchange rate movements, short-
term interest rates, budget deficits, and the ratio of the money
supply to foreign reserves held by the central bank. Specific finan-
cial sector variables include the ratio of credit to the private sector
as a fraction of GDP, the growth of credit to the private sector, the
presence or absence of deposit insurance, and the presence or ab-
sence of controls on interest rates.
The remainder of this section reviews each of the different
economic and financial sector variables used in the analysis, their
predicted effect on financial crisis, and the influence of checks and
balances on this predicted effect.
3.1 Real GDP Growth
Faster real GDP growth is generally predicted to reduce the
probability of banking crises, since borrowers are less likely to
default when growth is rapid and their activities are more profit-
able. Ideal-ly, a regulatory system would mute the effects of the
business cycle on the quality of lending portfolios, so that the ef-
fects of real GDP growth would be greater in countries with poor
regulatory systems (for example, where checks and balances are
few) and weaker in more stringent regulatory environments, where
regulators keep a tight rein on portfolio risk. However, economy-
wide risks are the most difficult to diversify against, and this lim-
its the effectiveness of regulatory intervention. It is certainly a
well-observed phenomenon that portfolio risk moves with the busi-
ness cycle even in the best-regulated countries. Therefore one ex-
pects the presence of checks and balances to make little difference
to the impact of growth on crisis.
3.2 Inflation
Inflation increases the risk that banks will be forced to raise
nominal deposit rates to attract funds. If their nominal returns on9 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
long-term assets are fixed or respond sluggishly to the increased
cost of funds, an increase in deposit rates reduces profitability,
increasing the threat of systemic insolvency. The perfect bank regu-
lator would ensure that portfolios are not excessively weighted
with long-term fixed-rate loans, to minimize the effect of inflation.
As with GDP growth, this is a formidable regulatory challenge. We
would therefore expect the effect of inflation on a crisis in the
absence of checks and balances to be the same as or greater than
the effect of inflation in the presence of checks and balances.
3.3 Real Income per Capita
Higher real income per capita is expected to reduce the threat of
banking crises in several ways. First, wealthier countries are more
likely to be able to afford the costs of efficient financial sector regula-
tion. Second, banks in these countries are more likely to be able to
diversify their lending portfolios, in part because wealthier countries
are more attractive locations for (better diversified) international
banks.
Checks and balances have an ambiguous effect here. On one hand,
the presence of checks and balances drives up the incentives of politi-
cal actors to adopt good regulation, independent of the wealth of a
country. Consequently, in countries that already exhibit more exten-
sive checks and balances, the effect of additional wealth on the estab-
lishment of sound prudential regulation could be modest. This would
suggest that the impact of wealth on banking crises should be greater
in countries that lack checks and balances.
On the other hand, property rights are stronger in the presence
of checks and balances (see, for example, North and Weingast, 1989,
and Keefer and Knack, 1997). International banks are therefore more
likely to move into wealthy countries where checks and balances
prevail (and where they can therefore be more confident that
government policies will not be changed in ways that might devalue
their investment). This would suggest that the moderating effect of
income per capita on banking crises should be stronger where checks
and balances are greater.
3.4 Budget Deficits
Larger government budget deficits are expected to increase
the probability of crisis for at least two reasons. First, when thePhilip Keefer 10
budget deficit increases, countries are less able to undertake fis-
cally costly interventions in insolvent banks. By failing to inter-
vene in scattered insolvent institutions early, they increase the
chances of a systemic crisis later. Second, governments confront-
ing severe fiscal difficulties are more likely to use the financial
sector as an off-budget source of funding for government objec-
tives, by pressuring banks to direct loans to favored borrowers.
Since securing repayment of loan obligations from these borrow-
ers is typically a difficult proposition for banks, these pressures
can translate into solvency difficulties for the financial system.
For reasons set out earlier, the effect of checks and balances on
the impact of budget deficits is ambiguous. On one hand, as the lite-
rature on divided government suggests, governments that exhibit
more checks and balances always confront greater intragovernmental
bargaining costs before making the decision to intervene; these costs
conceivably rise with the magnitude of fiscal deficits. In this case, the
effect of deficits on raising the probability of financial crisis would be
exacerbated where checks and balances are more extensive.
On the other hand, checks and balances can also mitigate the
effects of budget deficits on the probability of crisis. Governments
with more extensive checks and balances are likely to be more cre-
dible and therefore better positioned to issue debt to finance public
sector deficits. They can more easily avoid raids on the resources of
the financial sector to finance fiscal exigencies. In addition, advocates
of a sound financial system, who are more likely to be in the govern-
ment when checks and balances are more extensive, can block
government actions that threaten banks. They can stop coercive
government actions meant to persuade banks to lend to particular
risky borrowers. They can also insulate regulators from pressure to
overlook imprudent banking practices that would flow from decisions
to lend to government-favored risky borrowers. For either reason,
then, increased checks and balances might reduce the impact of bud-
get deficits on the probability of a bank crisis. The net influence of
checks and balances on the relationship between deficits and banking
crises is therefore ambiguous.
3.5 Short-Term Interest Rates
Rising short-term real interest rates increase the probability of
bank crises in two ways. First, like inflation, they raise the cost of
short-run funds to banks, hurting profits when returns on long-term
assets are fixed. Second, they may presage a deterioration in the11 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
quality of bank assets if the increases are the result of interbank com-
petition to finance risky loans. In either case, successful regulation
(and therefore checks and balances) should mitigate the effect of
changes in interest rates on the probability of bank crisis.
3.6 Currency Devaluation
Devaluation makes foreign currency obligations more expensive,
triggering crises among those banks or bank borrowers with signifi-
cant offshore exposure. The effects of checks and balances on this
variable are mixed, however. On one hand, in a lax regulatory envi-
ronment banks are more likely to be insufficiently diversified against
the risk of devaluation. This would suggest that devaluation would
have a greater effect where there are fewer checks and balances. On
the other hand, devaluation has serious implications for the financial
sector only to the extent that firms or financial institutions take on
foreign currency liabilities to acquire local currency-denominated
assets in the first place. They will do this only if they believe the
exchange rate guarantees announced by the government. Since go-
vernments with checks and balances are likely to be more credible,
this would argue for the opposite effect: devaluation would have a
greater effect where there are more checks and balances.
3.7 Ratio of the Money Supply to Foreign Reserves
Held by the Central Bank
The argument for an effect of the money supply-reserves ratio
is similar to the argument regarding exchange rates. An increase
in the money supply (M2) relative to foreign reserves increases
the vulnerability of countries to sudden capital outflows and, ulti-
mately, to a rapid collapse of the exchange rate. This can precipi-
tate a financial crisis when the financial sector holds substantial
liabilities denominated in foreign currency. The effect of checks
and balances on this variable is identical to its effect on currency
devaluation: that is, the effect is ambiguous.
On one hand, excessive holdings of foreign currency-denominated
liabilities can be viewed as a product of regulatory failure, which should
be more likely in countries with fewer checks and balances. This sug-
gests that the effect of this ratio on the probability of bank crisis
should be lower when checks and balances are strong. However, sud-
den capital outflows are most likely to occur when previously cred-
ible governments, and in particular the promises of government toPhilip Keefer 12
maintain a particular exchange rate, come to be seen as noncredible.
Governments with few checks and balances are less likely to be
viewed as credible in the first place, so the amount of hard currency
that private actors will risk in such countries is lower for every
level of the M2-reserves ratio. This suggests that the effect of this
ratio would be  greater in countries with more checks and balances.
3.8 Terms-of-Trade Changes
Even prudent banks find it difficult to diversify against the threat
of terms-of-trade shocks, which are expected to increase the risk of
bank crisis. However, the potential for diversification and prudent
management to mitigate these shocks is never zero (see Wilson,
Caprio, and Saunders, 1997, on Mexico), and countries that exhibit
checks and balances are likely to encourage greater diversification
for two different reasons.
First, where checks and balances are greater, governments are
more credible, and better-diversified international banks are more
likely to enter countries that are more vulnerable to terms-of-trade
shocks. Second, where checks and balances are greater, the quality
of regulation is likely to be better, and the extent of bank preparation
against the eventuality of a shock is likely to be greater. This again
mitigates the influence of shocks on bank crises. Although terms-of-
trade shocks should have a positive association with bank crises in
all countries, this association should be still higher in countries with
few checks and balances.
3.9 Lending to the Private Sector and the Rate of
Credit Growth
Since banks would normally prefer low-risk loans to high-risk
loans, both an increase in lending to the private sector as a fraction
of GDP and an increase in the rate of credit growth might be asso-
ciated with growing risk in bank portfolios, increasing the risk of
systemic insolvency. However, following earlier arguments, where
checks and balances are more extensive, and regulation therefore is
presumably stronger, these effects should be mitigated.
3.10 Ratio of Bank Cash and Reserves to Bank Assets
The ratio of bank cash and reserves to bank assets is an impor-
tant policy lever used by regulators to control the risk of bank failure.13 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
The vulnerability of banks to crisis is usually predicted to fall when
this ratio rises, since greater cash reserves presumably cushion a
bank against a rash of nonperforming loans. The effect of political
structure on this variable is ambiguous, however.
Banks always gain by overstating their cash reserves, since this
builds up the confidence of depositors and other bank creditors. Checks
and balances and a stronger regulatory structure are likely to inhibit
banks from such overstatement, however. On the other hand, if regu-
lators require banks to maintain larger cash holdings than they pre-
fer, banks, in response, may attempt to offset the low profits from
these holdings by extending more risky, high-return loans than they
otherwise would have. The net effect of this portfolio shift can, in
principle, be a net increase in the riskiness of the portfolio.
In addition, a spurious positive relationship between cash hold-
ings and crisis probability is possible if regulators, in response to
other signals of impending systemic insolvency, require a significant
increase in the cash holdings of banks. Since this action will be fol-
lowed by, or coincide with, bank crises in many instances, empirical
work could reveal (and does reveal in the regressions that follow) a
contemporaneous association between high cash reserves and the
probability of bank crises.
3.11 Deposit Insurance
Two policy variables specific to the financial sector have also been
used as predictors of financial crisis. One of these is the presence of
deposit insurance, and the other, discussed below, is the liberaliza-
tion of interest rates. Theory suggests two offsetting effects of de-
posit insurance. On one hand, it can lower the probability of bank
crisis by reducing the likelihood of bank runs. However, deposit
insurance also increases moral hazard problems in the financial sec-
tor by relieving depositors of the need to monitor the operations of
their bank, in turn encouraging bank owners to make imprudent
loans. The effects of deposit insurance on bank crisis are therefore
ambiguous.
The effect of checks and balances is similarly ambiguous. On one
hand, if the absence of checks and balances means that govern-
ments are not credible, depositors will be disinclined to rely on gov-
ernment promises to indemnify their savings in the event of bank
failure. The introduction of deposit insurance should therefore have
more modest effects when checks and balances are absent than when
they are present.Philip Keefer 14
On the other hand, there are two reasons to expect a stronger
positive association between deposit insurance and bank crises when
checks and balances are absent. First, the regulatory environment is
more likely to be deficient when checks and balances are few, in-
creasing the possibilities for abuse of the deposit insurance system
by banks. Second, the announcement of a deposit insurance program
is one possible response to bank crisis, intended to build depositor
confidence and forestall bank runs (see Cull, 1998). However, such an
announcement is more difficult in the presence of significant checks
and balances. This would lead to a stronger association of deposit
insurance with bank crises in the absence of checks and balances.
3.12 Financial Liberalization
Recent research has also examined the role of financial libera-
lization in triggering bank crises (see especially Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache, 1998). Liberalization (defined as the lifting of interest
ceilings on deposits) increases the risks to banks that the nominal
costs of short-term liabilities will exceed their nominal returns from
long-term assets. Liberalization also allows banks to compete for funds
by raising deposit rates. This facilitates attempts by banks to expand
their lending portfolios to include high-risk, high-interest loans, rais-
ing the probability of bank crisis in any given year.
Once again, political institutions are likely to affect whether
financial liberalizations are associated with crisis. Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998) point out that countries with poor regulation are
more likely to suffer from the ill effects of financial regulation, and
they find evidence of this. However, countries with fewer checks and
balances are likely to have worse regulation. Financial liberalization
should therefore be more strongly associated with bank crises in these
countries.
All of the predictions reviewed above are summarized in the far
right-hand column of table 1.
4. TESTING APPROACH
4.1  Measurement of Crisis and Specification Issues
The hypotheses reviewed above have implications both for the
magnitude of bank crises, measured for example by the magnitude of15 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
Source: Author’s calculations. See text.
a. Results of a logistic estimation; the dependent variable is a dummy set to equal 1 in the presence of a bank
crisis in a given year and 0 otherwise. Marginal effects at the means are reported in place of slope coefficients.
Numbers in parentheses are p values.
Table 1. Financial and Economic Determinants of Bank
Crises under Alternative Institutional Settingsa
Countries sorted according to
score on executive constraints
(EC)  variable
Countries sorted according
to score on party fractiona-
lization (PF)  variable
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unrecoverable loans in the banking system, and for whether a crisis
occurs or not in a particular year. Since better data are available on
the occurrence of crises, this paper focuses on the probability of
crisis in any given year. Both the data on crises and the testing
methodology are taken from Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997).
These authors classify any country as experiencing a financial sec-
tor crisis in a given year if, according to a series of other studies,
the country meets at least one of the following four conditions:
• The ratio of nonperforming assets to total assets in the banking
system exceeds 10 percent.
• A rescue operation is mounted costing at least 2 percent of
GDP.
• Banking sector problems result in a large-scale nationalization
of banks, or
• Extensive bank runs take place, or emergency measures such
as deposit freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit
guarantees are enacted by the government in response to the crisis.
The crisis data run from 1980 to 1994 and are available for sixty-
five countries.
Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, with many zero ob-
servations (years in which no crisis occurs) and relatively few ones
(years in which crises do occur), these authors adopt a multivariate
logistic estimation strategy. Essentially they estimate a hazard model
that indicates how the probability of a crisis occurring in any one
year depends on a set of independent variables. Their approach is
followed in this paper.
One notable difference between their work and the analysis here
is in the treatment of years following the onset of crisis. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache argue, reasonably, that the behavior and
interaction of some explanatory variables may be fundamentally
different during crises and that crises may influence these variables.
Consequently, in their baseline regressions they eliminate all obser-
vations after the onset of the crisis. The approach in this paper
is different because the entire sample is used, including both crisis
and noncrisis years. The most important reason for this is that the
arguments developed earlier generate predictions about whether
crises will be resolved rapidly or not. To examine these, it is neces-
sary to look at crisis as well as noncrisis years. In addition, although
crises certainly can feed back into the political structure, this effect
is likely to be less severe than with economic and financial variables.17 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
In any case, most of the results below are robust to the use of a
sample that omits all but the first crisis year in countries.
The earlier discussion suggests that checks and balances influen-
ce the probability of bank crises through many of the other indepen-
dent variables. Such indirect effects can be captured with interaction
terms, but these are impractical when the predicted interactions are
as abundant as they are here, as they would give rise to widespread
multicollinearity. Two approaches are therefore taken. First, regres-
sions are run with the full set of economic and financial variables,
but with the sample divided according to whether countries exhibit
high or low values of the particular checks and balances variable un-
der consideration. The experiment here asks whether the effect of
all the economic and political changes is substantially different in
countries with high than in countries with low checks and balances.
The second experiment examines the direct and indirect effects of
checks and balances, for the whole sample of countries, in a single
regression with a more limited number of control variables.
4.2 Measuring Checks and Balances
The remaining empirical issue to be discussed is the measure-
ment of checks and balances. Ideally we would want to know which
decisionmakers in each country control financial sector policy, their
incentives and their independence from each other, and whether or
not each decisionmaker has veto power over any changes of policy.
Such data are not available on a cross-country basis. Instead two proxy
variables are used. One, called “executive constraints,” is a subjec-
tive evaluation of the extent to which the executive branch of govern-
ment is constrained. Collected by political scientists, this varia-ble
comes from the Polity II data set compiled by Gurr, Jaggers, and
Moore (1989). Its usefulness as a proxy for checks and balances is
straightforward to describe. The variable ranges from 1 to 7, with 1
indicating that “there are no regular limitations on the executive’s
actions (as distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or
actuality of coups and assassinations),”and 7 indicating that groups
such as a legislature or a ruling party have “effective authority
equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity.”
The second proxy for checks and balances in government used in
this paper is called “party fractionalization.” The presumption here is
that, where parties are fractionalized, building coalitions for policy
change requires the agreement of a greater number of independentPhilip Keefer 18
actors. That is, each party is a potential veto player; where the party
system is fractionalized, the number of such veto players potentially
rises. This is another form of checks and balances. The party frac-
tionalization variable is assembled by Banks (1993) and is computed
as the probability that any two legislators drawn from the legislature
will not come from the same party. Thus a value of 0 would indicate
no fractionalization, and a value of 1 complete fractionalization.
These variables are inevitably imperfect proxies for checks and
balances. Apart from the issues raised earlier, the party fractiona-
lization variable does not distinguish between countries with a frac-
tionalized government and unitary opposition and countries with the
reverse. Only the former would be predicted to lead to greater checks
and balances. However, the inherent measurement error in the proxy
biases the results against a finding that checks and balances matter
for policy outcomes.
5. THE EFFECT OF CHECKS AND BALANCES ON THE
ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF CRISIS
The first experiment, then, is to observe the effect of the stan-
dard economic and financial determinants of bank crises under differ-
ent institutional environments. Table 1 presents the results of this
experiment. Rather than the slope parameters, this and all the tables
in the paper report the marginal effects of the variables at their means
(that is, the percentage increase in the probability of banking crises
for a one-unit increase in the independent variable, measured at the
means of all the variables).8
The first conclusion to be drawn from table 1 emerges from two
rows near the bottom of the table, which report the number of crises
and the number of observations. The ratio of crises to observations is
nearly the same in columns 1b and 2b (20.7 percent versus 18.2 per-
cent), and only slightly higher in column 1a than column 2a (22.4
percent versus 16.8 percent). This suggests that the effect of checks
and balances is both to handicap and to assist countries in defusing
bank crises. In practice, the offsetting effects appear to balance out.
8. Using ordinary least squares, the standardized estimate is simply the slope
parameter estimate divided by the ratio of the standard deviation of the depen-
dent variable to the standard deviation of the explanatory variable. However,
since a nonlinearity multinomial logistic estimation strategy is used, the standard-
ized estimate is the standard deviation of the underlying distribution (the inverse
of the logistic function), evaluated at the mean of the independent variable.19 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
The second conclusion to be drawn from table 1, and the cen-
tral point of this paper, is that the determinants of bank crises are
quite different in countries that exhibit checks and balances from
those in countries that do not. In particular, movements in the
terms of trade, the ratio of M2 to foreign reserves, the ratio of
cash reserves held by banks to their assets, credit to the private
sector, and the presence of deposit insurance have a much differ-
ent impact across the two groups of countries.
Changes in the terms of trade are predicted to have a greater
impact on the probability of bank crises in the absence of checks and
balances, whether checks and balances are proxied by executive cons-
traints or by party fractionalization. The effect of the terms of trade is
insignificant in countries with more extensive checks and balances. In
countries with few checks on the executive, improvements in the terms
of trade have a statistically significant and negative impact on the prob-
ability of banking crises. The effect is not large, however: a 50-point
decline in the terms of trade (the sample values range from –50 to 53)
is associated in column 1a with a 5 percent increase in the probability
of a bank crisis.
No unambiguous prediction about the ratio of money to foreign
reserves in the central bank was possible, but the evidence suggests
a significant difference across countries. One predicted effect was that
the regulatory advantages of checks and balances would impede banks
from overexposing their portfolios to foreign currency-denominated
liabilities. This effect, however, turns out to be dominated by the
second predicted influence: only where governments are credible do
banks and firms build up large foreign currency liabilities in the first
place. These large liabilities make substantial capital outflows pos-
sible when governments begin to lose the confidence of investors,
increasing the ratio of money to foreign reserves. As a consequence,
this variable is positive and highly significant only in countries exhib-
iting more extensive checks and balances: a 1-standard-deviation
(40-point) increase in the ratio of money to foreign reserves is
associated with a 10-point increase in the probability of crisis in
the two subsamples with strong checks and balances.
The rate of devaluation is a similar variable that, most likely
because of multicollinearity, exhibits a different pattern in table 1:
in the executive constraints equations, it is borderline significant in
the low-constraints subsample. However, the economic and statisti-
cal effects are nearly indistinguishable across the high- and low-
checks-and-balances samples for both checks-and-balances variablesPhilip Keefer 20
and are too weak to call into question the strong effects indicated
for the money supply and foreign reserves.
The predicted effect of the ratio of cash and liquid reserves to
bank assets is also ambiguous. In the absence of checks and balan-ces
and sound regulation, one would expect banks to overstate their re-
serves, leading to a potentially positive relationship between reserves
and the occurrence of crises in these countries. On the other hand, in
countries with sound regulation, regulators might be effective in de-
manding higher reserves in the face of a crisis, leading to a spurious
positive association between the two, or regulators might enforce the
holding of excessive reserves, leading banks to increase the riskiness
of their lending portfolio to compensate for the low returns to
reserves.
The evidence suggests that some combination of the last two
effects is dominant. Cash reserves have a modest, statistically in-
significant, negative impact on crisis in countries with few checks
and balances, in all likelihood suggesting that both good and bad
banks report high returns in such countries, obscuring the statis-
tical connection between reserves and solvency. In countries with
extensive checks and balances, however, reserves have a positive
and statistically significant association with bank crises.
Credit to the private sector and credit growth were both pre-
dicted to have a stronger positive association with crises in poorly
regulated financial sectors of countries that exhibit few checks and
balances. Evidence reported in table 1 supports this. Although all
the coefficients for credit growth are statistically insignificant, the
extent of credit to the private sector has a positive and statistically
significant association with crisis in countries lacking checks and
balances. An increase of 50 points in this variable (less than 1 stan-
dard deviation) is associated with a 25 percent increase in the prob-
ability of banking crises in the low-executive-constraints equation; a
1-standard-deviation increase in the low-fractionalization equation
is associated with a 12 percent increase in the probability of crisis.
In the case of the party fractionalization sample of countries, both
subsample coefficients are statistically significant. However, the
magnitude of the effect of credit to the private sector in the low-
fractionalization subsample is four times greater than the effect in
column 2b. Finally, as with other variables, it is not possible to make
unambiguous predictions about the effect of deposit insurance. Two
offsetting potential effects were suggested earlier.
On one hand, where regulation is poor (checks-and-balances
are absent), we would expect deposit insurance to have a positive21 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
association with crisis. On the other hand, where checks and bal-
ances are missing, we would also expect depositors to place less
faith in government deposit guarantees, and therefore place fewer
assets at risk. This would tend to minimize any crisis that might
occur. Results from table 1 suggest that the first effect dominates.
The effects of deposit insurance are statistically insignificant in
high-checks-and-balances countries. In low-checks-and-balances
countries, reinterpreting the results from table 1, the probability
of a crisis rises 20 percent when deposit insurance is introduced.9
Coefficients on the six remaining variables are either statisti-
cally insignificant or insignificantly different across subsamples.
Inflation and short-term interest rates were both expected to have
a similar effect across subsamples, or a somewhat stronger impact
in low-checks-and-balances countries. The evidence in table 1 shows
little difference. Contrary to expectations, the effect of real GDP
growth is statistically and economically much greater when checks
and balances are high.10  None of the coefficients are statistically
significant in the case of fiscal deficits. The evidence is strong
that, in countries with low checks and balances, real income per
capita matters significantly in preventing crises (every additional
$1,000 in income per capita reduces the risk of crisis by approxi-
mately 8 percent). The evidence is mixed on the effect of income
on crisis in countries with high checks and balances.
6. ROBUSTNESS TESTING AND THE DIRECT EFFECTS OF
CHECKS AND BALANCES
The results of table 1 support the argument that, although checks
and balances do not seem to affect the overall probability of a finan-
cial crisis occurring in a country, they do have a substantial effect on
the causes of crisis. These results are obtained by splitting the sample
according to the level of checks and balances exhibited by countries.
9. The marginal impacts are calculated at the means of the variables, which is
awkward for a dummy variable like deposit insurance. The 20 percent figure is
obtained instead by subtracting the marginal impact of deposit insurance when it
is assumed to be 1 from the marginal impact when it is assumed to be 0.
10. This may be due to a third effect not described earlier but consistent with
the main themes of this paper. In a poorly regulated environment, GDP growth is
more likely to be associated with excessively risky expansion of lending; this
offsets the positive effect that growth has in improving the ability of borrowers to
repay loans.Philip Keefer 22
To further examine these conclusions, this section reports the re-
sults of regressions that use the entire sample of countries and
that include checks-and-balances variables directly, interacting
them with key financial sector variables. In particular, the analy-
sis here considers the interaction of the two measures of checks
and balances with four financial sector variables: credit to the pri-
vate sector, credit growth, financial sector liberalization, and cash
reserves of banks as a fraction of total bank assets. These four
variables are singled out because they are the ones most likely to
be targeted by financial sector policymakers either as signals of
latent difficulties in the financial sector, or as policy instruments
that can be manipulated to avert a crisis.
The earlier discussion suggests that the inclusion of checks-and-
balances variables in the full specification of table 1 would create
severe multicollinearity problems, since the effects of most indepen-
dent variables depend in turn on the level of checks and balances in a
country. To minimize these, reduced specifications are employed with
two additional control variables: income per capita and growth.
Table 2 is the first of two tables that report the results from these
reduced specifications. The key variables in the four equations of this
table are the interactions of executive constraints and party fraction-
alization with the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP, and
with the rate of growth of credit lagged two years. From the earlier
discussion, one would expect these interaction terms to be negative:
at higher levels of checks and balances, tighter regulation is more
likely, and the positive association that these variables might have
with bank crises is reversed. In all four cases, as predicted, the inter-
action effect is of the expected sign and from reasonably to very
statistically significant.
This mitigating effect of checks and balances is also economically
significant. At the highest levels of executive constraints, for example,
credit to the private sector actually has a slightly negative impact on
the probability of bank crisis, whereas at the lowest value of execu-
tive constraints the impact of credit is positive and twenty times
greater than at the mean of executive constraints. An increase of 1
standard deviation in the ratio of credit to the private sector to GDP
(a 38-point increase) is associated with a 10.7 percent increase in the
probability of crisis at the lowest level of executive constraints (a
value of 1), but a 3 percent decline in the probability of crisis at the
highest level of executive constraints (a value of 7). Similarly, a
1-standard-deviation increase in credit growth (15 points) leads to a23 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
4 percent increase in the probability of bank crisis when party frac-
tionalization is at its lowest level (zero), but a 4 percent decline in the
probability of crisis when party fractionalization is at its highest level
(0.99).
At the same time, the table confirms the mixed picture in table 1
of the effect of checks and balances themselves on financial sector
crises. At mean values of the financial sector variables, a 1-standard-
deviation increase in executive constraints is associated with an ap-
proximately 3 percent reduction in the probability of banking crises.
The effect of party fractionalization is equally slight, but in the oppo-
site direction, when evaluated at the mean values of the financial
sector variables. At the same time, it is notable that the effects of
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The dependent variable is a dummy set to equal 1 in the presence of a bank crisis in a given year and 0 otherwise.
Coefficient estimates are marginal effects at the means; the direct effect of each component of an interaction
term is calculated at the mean of the other; for example, in the first column, the direct effect of executive
constraints is calculated as –0.021 –0.0006 * mean(credit to the private sector/GDP). Calculation of the signifi-
cance level of direct components (for example, executive constraints, credit to the private sector/GDP) assumes,
to the contrary, that the other interacted term is set to zero, not to its mean. Numbers in parentheses are p values.
Table 2. Results of Regressions with Variables Interacting
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checks and balances rise with the levels of the financial sector vari-
ables. That is, in situations that are most likely to give rise to a crisis
(explosive growth in credit, for example), the independent effect of
political institutions is most noticeable and economically significant.
The remaining two financial sector variables, interest liberaliza-
tion and the ratio of cash reserves held by banks to bank assets, are
examined in table 3. Like table 2, table 3 presents regressions that
control for growth and income per capita; credit growth lagged two
years is retained from the last table as an additional control. Inte-
rest liberalization was not included in table 1; it is a variable that
captures whether or not there are ceilings on interest rates (as pre-
sented in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998).
The evidence is once again consistent with the earlier discussion
and with the results in table 1. Interest liberalization has a significant
association with the probability of crisis, with liberalization corre-
sponding to a 22.7 percent increase in the probability of crisis when
the executive constraints variable is at its mean value, and a 16.6
percent increase when party fractionalization is at its mean value.
The effect of checks and balances is also economically significant.
Moving from the highest to the lowest value of executive constraints,
the association of interest liberalization with crisis increases from
20.9 percent to 27.4 percent. The effect is much larger with party
fractionalization. At the lowest value of party fractionalization, inter-
est liberalization is associated with a 39.6 percent increase in the
probability of financial crisis; at the highest value of party fractional-
ization, liberalization is associated with a 6.0 percent decline in the
probability of crisis.
The odd effect of cash reserves observed in table 1 is confirmed in
table 3. The explanation, as before, is that, in countries with effective
checks and balances, effective regulators are quicker to impose higher
reserve requirements in the face of a crisis threat. This leads to a
positive (and spurious) correlation between cash reserves and crisis.
7. OTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
The results in tables 1 through 3 embed a series of robustness
checks. These include very different specifications and measures of
checks and balances. The main finding of the paper, that the causes
of bank crises vary with political institutions, are robust to these
differences. The results are also robust to two other permutations.25 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
The effects reported in table 1 are insensitive to the use of the
median instead of the mean values of the checks-and-balances vari-
ables. They are also relatively insensitive to the exclusion of crisis
observations after the first year of crisis (there is a loss of signifi-
cance of the coefficients, but the magnitude and direction of dif-
ferences between coefficients under high and low levels of checks
are repeated). 11
Source: Author’s calculations.
a. The dependent variable is a dummy set to equal 1 in the presence of a bank crisis in a given year and 0 otherwise.
Coefficient estimates are marginal effects at the means; the direct effect of each component of an interaction
term is calculated at the mean of the other; for example, in the first column, the direct effect of executive
constraints is calculated as –0.0076 –0.00035*mean(interest liberalization). The significance level of direct
components (for example, executive constraints, interest liberalization) assumes, to the contrary, that the other
interacted term is set to zero, not to its mean. Numbers in parentheses are p values.
Table 3. Results of Regressions with Variables Interacting
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11. This test is in any case extreme, since it implies that subsequent crises are




















8. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
The argument that “institutions matter” is an important one, but
it is often difficult to translate into policy, particularly if one believes
that the only policy advice that emerges from institutional analysis is
that the institutions themselves must change. The analysis here points
to a different implication of institutions: that traditional policy in-
struments and indicators used in the financial sector should be viewed
differently in different institutional environments. Financial sectors
in countries with strong checks and balances seem to respond very
differently to changes in economic and financial variables that are
widely considered to be important in the analysis of banking crises.
The major question confronting financial sector policymakers is
the following: should they encourage the growth of the financial sec-
tor, for example by liberalizing interest rates, or should they reduce
the risks of financial sector crisis by, for example, controlling interest
rates? The evidence suggests that the dilemma confronted by
policymakers is much greater in countries that lack checks and bal-
ances. On one hand, interest liberalization is substantially more risky
in countries that lack checks and balances. On the other, credit growth
and the amount of private credit relative to GDP are both more
strongly associated with impending crisis in countries that lack checks
and balances. Deposit insurance, intended to facilitate increased
intermediation in a country and forestall the risk of banking crises,
has instead been found to be associated with a significantly higher
probability of bank crises in countries where checks and balances are
weak.
The influence of economic variables, which policymakers might
track in an attempt to anticipate crisis, also varies across political
institutions. Terms-of-trade shocks, found to be of minor importance
in previous literature, have a significant and discernible impact on
the probability of crisis in countries lacking checks and balances. Con-
versely, precisely because of their lack of credibility, in countries
lacking checks and balances the ratio of the money supply to foreign
reserves is a weak indicator of impending crisis, but it is a very good
indicator in countries that exhibit strong checks and balances.
Not only do political institutions have a significant effect on the
causes of banking crises, but the effect is of a magnitude that
frequently exceeds the effects of the more standard financial and
economic variables that are usually the focus of attention. Taken
together, then, the evidence suggests that the political origins of
ban-king crises merit significant attention in the design of effective
policies to forestall crisis, and to respond to crisis when it occurs.27 Politics and Determinants of Banking Crises
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